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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to section 78-2a3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issue to be decided on Appeal is whether the court, Judge Roger S. Dutson,
erred in denying Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Suppress. Specifically,
Defendant/Appellant asks this court to determine that his Fomth Amendment Right to be
protected from unreasonable search and seizure has been violated and that all evidence
illegally obtained should be suppressed. There are two standards for review to be used in
determining this issue:
a. As to the facts, this court examines the trial court's findings for clear error.
(State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994)
b. As to the law, this court examines whether the trial court made the correct
ruling, with a certain measure of discretion allowed the trial court based on the
facts of the case. (Id. at 1276).
This issue was preserved for Appeal by the Defendant/Appellant's conditional
guilty plea after denial of the Motion to Suppress. Addendum, page 10, Memorandum
Decision, dated February 17, 1998.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,...
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defendant/Appellant was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol. Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress which was heard by the
court November 21, 1997. The trial court denied this Motion on February 17,
1998. The Defendant/Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea and was
sentenced on or about April 22, 1998. The trial court also issued a Certificate of
Probable Cause that day and a Notice of Appeal was also filed April 22, 1998.
The facts of the case relevant to the issue presented for review are
as follows:
1. On September 24, 1997 at approximately 2:20 a.m., Defendant was
driving his vehicle west on 26th Street, in approximately the 800 block,
in Ogden City.
2. Officer Lane Olson, Ogden City Police, was on-duty at that time in the
1000 block of 26th Street and observed Defendant's vehicle.
3. Defendant's vehicle was traveling at a slow rate of speed, no more
than 15 mph, and had its hazard lights activated.
4. Defendant's vehicle was traveling in the middle of the outside lane.
5. The officer stated he pulled up to within 50 feet behind Defendant's
vehicle.
6. Defendant testified the officer pulled up so closely that his lights were
directly reflecting from Defendant's rear view mirror so that
Defendant thought the bright lights were on from the officer's vehicle.
7. The Defendant pulled over to the side of the road and stopped.

3

8. The officer pulled in behind Defendant's vehicle.
9. The officer called in the stop as a 'motorist assist".
10. The officer approached Defendant as Defendant sat in his vehicle.
11. The officer confronted Defendant and motioned for Defendant to roll
down his window.
12. Defendant rolled down his window and the officer asked if Defendant
was having vehicle problems, to which Defendant said, "y e s "
13. The officer asked if Defendant needed help and Defendant said, ' W .
14. The officer asked if he could contact someone for Defendant, and he
replied, "no".
15. The officer indicated that he smelled alcohol when Defendant spoke,
but did not smell alcohol prior to Defendant talking.
16. The officer then asked for ED, and Defendant gave the officer his Utah
State Identification card.
17. The officer then asked for Defendant's Driver's License. Defendant
asked, "Why, you asked for ID?" The officer said, "Yes, but I want
your Driver's License."
18. The officer indicated that Defendant was detained when he asked for
ED, but that he suspected Defendant has been drinking before he asked
for Defendant's ID.
19. Defendant felt he could not leave when the officer faced the vehicle
and motioned for Defendant to roll down the window.
20. No improper or suspicious driving pattern was observed by the officer.

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The officer seized the Defendant/Appellant by approaching from the rear with his
bright lights on which caused Defendant/Appellant to pull over to the side of the road.
The officer then motioned Defendant/Appellant to roll down his window which he did.
The officer had no reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant/Appellant. The officer's
actions violated the Defendant/Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights and all evidence
should be suppressed.
The officer was told by Defendant/Appellant that he did not need assistance. The
officer continued to question the Defendant/Appellant which led to continued detainment.
The officer's continued detainment exceeded the scope of the stop. Thus, all evidence
should be suppressed.
ARGUMENT
THE STANDARD FOR REVIEW FOR THIS CASE WAS SET BY THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT IN TERRY V. OHIO.
The standards to evaluate whether Defendant/Appellant's Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure has been violated, have been set by
the United States Supreme Court. In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968),
the Supreme Court set forth a two prong test the government must meet to overcome the
Fourth Amendment protection. First, the officer's initial stop must be justified and
second, his subsequent actions must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying
the stop. The court further held that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even if the purpose
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of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648,
59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979), as quoted in State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App.
1994).
In the Prouse case, and officer stopped a vehicle to check the driver's license and
registration information even though he had observed no violations, nor any suspicious
activity. As the officer walked towards the vehicle, he smelled marijuana smoke and
seized marijuana in plain view on the car floor. The court held that the trial court
properly suppressed the evidence because the officer had no reasonable suspicion to
justify the stop and thus had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The result in the instant case should be the same. The officer in this case had no
reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant/Appellant's car. There was no suspicious driving
pattern, no violations of any traffic or other laws and no other suspicious activity. Even
after Defendant/Appellant pulled over, once the officer determined that Defendant did not
want help he should have left the scene. See State v. Tetmeyer. 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah
App. 1997) for general discussion of reasonable suspicion. The smell of alcohol did not
cure the officer's violation of Defendant/Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights.
The result should be the same even though the officer said he smelled alcohol. In
State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994), the court held that the evidence should
have been suppressed by the trial court, based on the Terry and Prouse decisions. In that
case an officer received a report of a possible car prowl/car burglary at an apartment
complex. The dispatcher said the suspect was a chunky male, possibly Hispanic, with a
white tee-shirt. When the officer responded he noticed a vehicle with two occupants
leaving the area. The officer felt the passenger fit the description given by the dispatcher.
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He stopped the vehicle but determined that they were there for the purpose of dropping
off a friend who lived at the complex. During the course of the conversation the oflBcer
detected an odor of alcohol and arrested the driver for DUI. The Utah Appellate Court
held that there were no facts to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
justify the stop. Further, the stop was unlawful because the oflBcer was not able to
corroborate any information given him by the dispatcher. The court then directed the
trial court to suppress ".. .all evidence flowing from the seizure...," Case, at 1280, even
though the oflBcer smelled alcohol while conversing with the Defendant.
In the instant case, the oflBcer had no facts whatsoever to support a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity of this Defendant, to justify stopping him. Therefore, here,
as in Case the stop was unlawful. Thus, this court should suppress all evidence flowing
from the seizure.
EVEN IF THE OFFICER'S DETENTION OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS
LAWFUL HE EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE DETENTION

Even if this court holds that the stop was lawful, the court should find that the
oflBcer exceeded the scope of the stop and thus violated the second prong of Terry. In
State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992), the court so held. There, an
officer stopped a vehicle from out-of-state and having determined there was no illegal
activity, continued to question the driver. The oflBcer stated the Defendant/driver
appeared nervous and thus the oflBcer asked Defendant if he could search the car,
Dciendant agreed, and the oflBcer found four kilograms of cocaine in the trunk. The
court held that the officer's continued questioning of the Defendant exceeded the scope
of the stop and so suppressed the evidence of the cocaine.
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In the instant case, once the officer determined Defendant/Appellant did not want
assistance he should have walked away. The officer only smelled alcohol when
Defendant/Appellant talked. He did not smell alcohol when Defendant/Appellant rolled
down the window, prior to answering the officer's questions. There was no other
evidence of illegal driving, and it is not a violation of law for a person to drive a vehicle
while his or her breath smells like alcohol. The officer's subsequent actions, after
determining Defendant/Appellant did not want assistance, exceeded the scope of the stop
and thus the court should suppress all evidence obtained by the officer.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, because the officer did not legally stop Defendant/Appellant the
court should suppress all evidence flowing therefrom, including field sobriety tests,
intoxilyzer test results, statements made by Defendant/Appellant and all other evidence.
Assuming, arguendo, the stop was legal, the court should still suppress all evidence
flowing therefrom, because the officer exceeded the scope of the stop.
Respectfully submitted thispc Ojn

day of June, 1998.

Tfed K. Godfrey
Attorney for Defenda
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
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Attorney for Appellee
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Office of the Attorney General
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ADDENDUM
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

OGDENCITY,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 975006623 TC
Honorable Roger S. Dutson

NEAL C. KROGH,
Defendant.

The court finds the initial stop of defendant by the officer was proper under permitted
community caretaking functions. The court finds that during the initial conversation the officer
observed the odor of alcohol comingfromthe driver of this vehicle which had been driving very
slowly down the road at about 2:00 a.m. with his emergency lights blinking. The driver told the
officer he was having vehicle problems but that he did not want any assistance.
The courtfindsfromthe foregoing facts there were enough unusual circumstances to justify
an articulable suspicion to proceed with further investigation of a suspected DUI. Therefore,
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.
DATED this P t h day of February. 1 9 9 8 ^ "

X
C*

' A

)

ROGER S. DUTSON
bty T^UML Wood
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ^i** cuJddnau^CUJJ&n.

City vs. Krogh
975006623 TC
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